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In recent years, American Indians have instituted a number of lawsuits
to regain lands in the eastern United States1 allegedly alienated from their
possession in violation of the Indian Nonintercourse Act.2 Probably the
most publicized of these cases is the Passamaquoddy tribe's claim to ap-
proximately two-thirds of the state of Maine3 although other suits include
the Oneidas' claim to 246,000 acres of New York4 and the Catawba tribe's
attempt to regain 140,000 acres in South Carolina.5 Since vast expanses of
land are at stake, judicial interpretation and application of the Indian
Nonintercourse Act have assumed substantial significance in the litigation.
Presently, a potentially important aspect of the litigation concerning the
Indian Nonintercourse Act is defining what constitutes an Indian "tribe."
6
If an Indian group fails to prove that it is a "tribe" as contemplated by
the Nonintercourse Act, a court will not order the return of land allegedly
alienated from the Indians' possession in violation of the Act.7 Previous
recognition as a tribe by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is a persuasive
1. See Vollmann, A Survey of Eastern Indian Land Claims: 1970-1979, 31 ME. L. REV.
5 (1979).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat.
137, 138, as amended by Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730).
3. See Comment, Resolution of Eastern Indian Land Claims. A Proposalfor Negotiated
Settlements, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 695 (1978); I/Indian Tribes Win Legal War to Regain Hal/of
Maine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 4, 1977, at 53.
4. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977)
(seeking trespass damages for illegal use and occupancy of tribal lands).
5. See Vollmann, supra note 1, at 12. The land claimed by the Catawba tribe was
originally reserved to the tribe in a treaty with the British Crown and later ceded to the state
of South Carolina. Id.
6. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), a'dsub
nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
138 (1979); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I.
1976); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (N.D.
Me.), afj'd, 528 F.2d 370 (lst Cir. 1975); note 75 and accompanying text infra. See also St.
Clair & Lee, Defense of Nonintercourse Act Claims.- The Requirement of Tribal Existence, 31
ME. L. REV. 91 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978).
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credential in proving tribal status,8 but not every tribe involved in litiga-
tion has this benefit of prior federal recognition. In such cases, the legal
definition of Indian "tribe" is of enormous importance as it may essentially
determine the legal rights of the parties to the disputed land.
When confronted with the question of tribal existence, courts adjudicat-
ing land claims under the Act have employed a definition of tribe devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Montoya v. United States,9 a case not
involving the Nonintercourse Act. The definition states that a "tribe" is "a
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
sometimes ill-defined territory."'" Unfortunately, this definition, devel-
oped in 1901, has never been a realistic description of what constitutes an
Indian tribe within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act. Yet, since
1901 no court has carefully analyzed the definition's appropriateness to the
purpose of the Act or the policies of modern Indian law. Consequently,
bona fide Iidian tribes, particularly ones not federally recognized, are
threatened with the possibility of losing potentially large land claims be-
cause of an anachronistic concept of tribe." This Comment will analyze
relevant areas of Indian law in order to develop a modem definition of
"tribe" that is more compatible with contemporary Indian law, the pur-
poses of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, and the historical experience of
the Indian tribes.
I. LAND CLAIMS UNDER THE INDIAN NONINTERCOURSE ACT
In the early 1800's, the Supreme Court decided that the United States,
by virtue of its role as successor to the European nations previously own-
ing American land, holds a fee interest to all Indian territory within its
boundaries. 2 The Court held that the Indians had aboriginal title' 3 to
8. See Oneida Indian Nation v. City of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
State v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551 (Me. 1979). The Bureau of Indian Affairs issues guidelines for
determining tribal status. See 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (1978).
9. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
10. Id. at 266. See note 25 and accompanying text infra. See also United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D.
Mass. 1978); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649
(N.D. Me. 1975).
11. See notes 35-51 and accompanying text infra.
12. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See generally Clinton &
Hotobb, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land- The
Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17 (1979).
13. 21 U.S. at 592. Indian, or "aboriginal," title is commonly understood as a right of
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much of the land claimed by the United States in the last two hundred
years. Tribes possessing aboriginal title have a legal right to use and oc-
cupy their land, but only the United States government is empowered to
purchase aboriginal title from them and thereby gain a fee simple interest
in the land.' 4 This principle of Indian property law became the letter of
federal law in the Indian Nonintercourse Act,' 5 originally enacted in 1790,
which provides that "[no purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance of
lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made
by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution."
' 16
It might appear that the Nonintercourse Act is designed only to preserve
the government's control over Indian lands, but actually it is settled that
the purpose of the Act is also to prevent tribes "from improvidently dispos-
ing of their lands and becoming homeless public charges."17 Although this
position is not specifically supported by the Act's legislative history,'" it is
nevertheless compatible with one of the basic tenets of Indian law: statutes
concerning Indians should be construed liberally in the Indians' favor.' 9
If a tribe of Indians wants to recover land alienated in violation of the
Nonintercourse Act, it must demonstrate that:
occupancy good against all but the federal government. It is termed "aboriginal" title be-
cause at the time of discovery and colonization of North America, the European nations
regarded the Indians as having a communal interest in the lands they occupied and hunted
on. Indian use and occupancy of land, moreover, was considered in the context of Indian
ways of life. See Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
14. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974). See Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (fifth amendment does not require
payment of consideration when aboriginal land is confiscated by the federal government);
Note, Indian Title. The Rights ofAmerican Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time
Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655 (1975).
15. See note 2 supra.
16. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976).
17. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441 (1926). See also Federal Power
Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960) (Act intended to prevent the
unfair, improvident, or improper disposition by Indians of lands owned or possessed by
them); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (Act intended to
protect Indian rights of occupancy); Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Auth., 257 F.2d
885, 888 (2d Cir. 1958), vacatedas moot sub nom. McMorran v. Tuscarora Nation of Indians,
362 U.S. 608 (1960) (purpose of Act to prevent Indians from being victimized by artful
scoundrels inclined to make a sharp bargain).
18. See Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649,
656 (N.D. Me. 1975).
19. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,199-201 (1975); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665 (1912).
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(1) it is or represents an Indian "tribe" within the meaning of
the Act;
(2) the parcels of land at issue are covered by the Act as tribal
land;
(3) the United States has never consented to the alienation of
the tribal land;
(4) the trust relationship between the United States and the
tribe, which is established by coverage of the Act, has never been
terminated or abandoned.2°
If the Indians succeed in proving this primafacie case, their claim to the
lands cannot be defeated by defenses such as adverse possession, laches,
bona fide purchaser for value, or a statute of limitations.2, However, the
first element of the primafacie case can be very difficult to prove for In-
dian groups without federal recognition because the legal definition of
"tribe" fails to account for the disintegrating influences the loss of land has
had on the tribe.
II. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF "TRIBE" IN THE INDIAN
NONINTERCOURSE ACT
The present judicial definition of "tribe" was first articulated in Montoya
v. United States,22 a case involving application of the Indian Depredation
Act.23 The purpose of the Depredation Act was to compensate United
States citizens for property loss resulting from acts of violence "committed
by individual marauders belonging to a body [of Indians] ...at peace
with the Government., 24 The statute was not applicable to damages re-
20. Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I.
1976). In respect to the first element of the primajacie case, an alleged tribe must prove
tribal status so that it can establish standing to bring suit and to establish a right to recovery.
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 581 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
138 (1979).
21. See, e.g., United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938)
(since the land is not freely alienable by the Indians, title cannot be acquired through ad-
verse possession); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) (suit brought by the United States on behalf of the Indians cannot be barred by state
laws of adverse possession, laches, or state statutes of limitations); Schaghticoke Tribe of
Indians v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780, 785 (D. Conn. 1976) (explaining why laches
and adverse possession do not apply).
22. 180 U.S. 261 (1901). Montoya concerned the question of the applicability of the
Depredation Act to a group of several hundred Apache Indians that had fled their reserva-
tion to engage in numerous hostile acts. The Court concluded that the Indians were a band
not in amity with the United States and that therefore the Depredation Act did not apply.
23. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 538, § 1, 26 Stat. 851.
24. 180 U.S. at 264-65. If these requirements were satisfied, then the government and
the marauding Indian body were jointly liable to the victims. Id.
[Vol. 29:625
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suiting from the violent acts of an independent band or tribe not at peace
with the United States. A political relationship between the United States
and the Indian tribe accused of the violence was required; if the marauders
were an autonomous entity, without any affiliation to a tribe having a
peaceful political relationship with the United States, then the government
was not liable for their violent acts.
Recognizing tribal status as a threshold issue, the Montoya Court de-
fined "tribe" as "a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in
a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a partic-
ular though sometimes ill-defined territory."25 Despite the apparent sig-
nificance of tribal status for recovery under the Depredation Act, the Court
failed to offer any justification for its definition, simply stating a definition
of tribe without any accompanying analysis of the specific issue. Instead,
most of the Court's analysis focuses upon the meaning of "band" and upon
the distinction between a riot and a war. Notably, the discussion of the
meaning of war was centered upon political concepts respecting hostile
acts as a method of social change and the nature of combat between orga-
nized groups representing separate nations.26
This aspect of the Montoya decision helps to suggest a reason for the
"united in a community under one leadership or government" require-
ment. If the accused Indian group had an organization fitting this descrip-
tion, it would be easier to characterize its acts as war and therefore enable
the government to escape liability. That is to say, the Court was attempt-
ing to devise a definition of tribe that would reflect the political nature of
war in order to facilitate a determination of whether or not the Depreda-
tion Act applied.27 Consequently, the legal validity of the Montoya defini-
tion outside of the context of the Depredation Act is questionable.
The first case to apply the Montoya definition to the Indian
Nonintercourse Act, United States v. Candelaria,28 also lacks an analysis of
the definition's legal validity. Confronted with the issue of the Act's appli-
cability to the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, the Candelaria Court
merely cited Montoya and quickly concluded that the Pueblo Indians were
25. Id. at 266.
26. Id. at 266-67.
27. Id.
28. 271 U.S. 432 (1926). In Candelaria, the United States government, on behalf of the
Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, brought suit to quiet title to lands allegedly belonging to the
Indians. Tribal status was at issue because of disagreement concerning whether the United
States government had a guardian-ward relationship with the Pueblos. The Court con-
cluded that a guardian-ward relationship existed, and thus the United States was able to
represent the Indians in court.
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covered under the Act.29 Candelaria is therefore of little value in ascer-
taining why the Montoya definition has been used for the determination of
tribal status under the Indian Nonintercourse Act.
The next case to apply Montoya to the Act was Joint Tribal Council of
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton.3" The Passamaquoddies of Maine
sought a declaratory judgment on the question of whether the
Nonintercourse Act entitled them to federal protection in court.3 ' Only for
purposes of that case did the court view the plaintiffs as a tribe within the
meaning of the Act.32 For two reasons, therefore, the decision is not strong
authority for using the Montoya definition. First, the parties stipulated
that the Passamaquoddies were "a tribe racially and culturally, ' 33 and sec-
ond, the court of appeals did nothing more than footnote Montoya and
Candelaria in summarily concluding that the Passamaquoddies were a
29. The Court simply borrowed the Montoya definition without explaining whether
there were similar purposes or policies between the Indian Nonintercourse Act and the In-
dian Depredation Act that would support its decision to use the Montoya definition. See id
at 442. By holding that the Pueblo Indians were a tribe, the Candelaria decision contra-
dicted the earlier case of United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1877). In Joseph, the
Supreme Court held that the Pueblos were not a tribe within the meaning of the
Nonintercourse Act because they had been assimilated into non-Indian society. Id. at 617-
18. See United States v. Cisna, 25 F. Cas. 422 (No. 14,795) (C.C.D. Ohio 1835). Two com-
mentators have recently argued that Joseph established assimilation as a primary factor in
determining whether tribal existence has terminated for purposes of the Nonintercourse Act
and that Cande/aria left this factor intact. See St. Clair & Lee, supra note 6, at 108-10.
The problem with stressing assimilation as a method of demonstrating the absence of
tribal existence is that such an approach unduly restricts the meaning of "tribe" under the
Act. There is little possibility of furthering the protective purposes of the Act and the liberal
tenets of Indian law if assimilation is viewed as the primary factor in determining tribal
status because assimilation is likely to be a symptom of the original injury, loss of land.
Additionally, it is unclear from the Joseph and Candelaria cases what weight the Supreme
Court was attaching to the factor of assimilation. That is not to say, however, that assimila-
tion is irrelevant in the context of the Nonintercourse Act. Total assimilation into non-
Indian society would necessarily demonstrate the lack of tribal status. But, short of total
assimilation, cultural factors and the Indian viewpoint ought to be stressed more heavily
than assimilation when determining tribal status under the Act if the purpose of the Act is to
be furthered. One way to ensure that those factors will be given greater weight than assimi-
lation is to require a tribe to demonstrate some evidence of political cohesion but not neces-
sarily effective political control over its members.
30. 388 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Me.), aft'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
31. Specifically, the Passamaquoddies argued that the federal government owed a duty
to them to sue the state of Maine on their behalf. The Passamaquoddies alleged that the
state of Maine had, among other things, divested the tribe of much of its aboriginal land in
violation of the Nonintercourse Act. 388 F. Supp. at 653.
32. 528 F.2d at 376-77.
33. Id See Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061, 1062 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1979)
(since tribal status had been stipulated in Passamaquoddy, the issue is still open); State v.




tribe.34 Consequently, Passamaquoddy suffers from the same dearth of un-
reasoned analysis as Candelaria.
Although the unsupported Montoya definition has been in existence
since 1901, it was not until Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.3 5 in 1979
that a court first questioned its appropriateness. The Mashpee Indians of
Massachusetts alleged that various land sales to non-Indians from 1870
until the present were in violation of the Indian Nonintercourse Act.36
The unique history of the Mashpees made it more difficult to prove the
alleged violation, as frequent intermarriage with non-Indians,3 7 a suscepti-
bility to foreign culture and religion,38 and the twentieth-century influx of
non-Indians into the town 39 made the threshold issue of tribal status a
complicated factual question for the court to resolve. In an attempt to
prove tribal status, the Mashpees argued that they had a chief, a medicine
man, a tribal council for a time, and that in 1974 they formed the
Mashpee-Wampanoag Indian Tribal Council. 40 However, the degree of
leadership and influence exercised by these officials and organizations over
the Mashpees was contested extensively.4  After being instructed on the
Montoya elements of "tribe," the jury concluded that the Mashpees were a
34. 528 F.2d at 377 n.8.
35. 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 138 (1979). During the time between
the Passamaquoddy and Mashpee decisions, only one case cited the Monloya definition.
Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Land Dev. Corp. 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1977). How-
ever, the issue of tribal existence was not specifically litigated in the case, and thus the opin-
ion adds nothing beyond Passamaquoddy to an understanding of the definition's utility. See
id. at 807-09.
36. The land in question is located around Cape Cod and the town of Mashpee, Massa-
chusetts. Two acts of the General Court (legislature) of Massachusetts were alleged to have
violated the Act. First, in 1869, the General Court granted citizenship to the Mashpees and
gave them authority to sell their lands. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp.
940, 946 (D. Mass. 1978). Second, in 1870, Mashpee was incorporated as a town and the
administrative machinery for the sale of land within the town limits was created. Id. These
two acts by the General Court did not immediately cause a substantial amount of sales by
Indians to non-Indians. But, from the 1930's through the 1970's, a substantial amount of
Indian land was transferred to non-Indians. This change of circumstances prompted the
Mashpee case. Id.
37. Many Mashpee males were killed in the American revolution, and their widows
subsequently married non-Indians who came to the area. The non-Indians were mostly
blacks, but the group included a Portuguese sailor and a few escaped Hessians. Id. at 944.
38. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d at 581.
39. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. at 946. Urban growth brought
land developers and many non-Indians to the town. Id.
40. Id. at 947. In fact, the Mashpees, starting in the 1920's, had practiced the dances
and songs of certain Plains Indians because their own had been lost. This loss of customs is
true for other east coast Indians as well. Id.
41. Id. The district court in its opinion, however, did not examine the specific argu-
ments raised in the dispute.
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tribe for a short time during the nineteenth century, but had not continued
to be a tribe up to the time that suit was brought.42 Based upon the jury's
conclusion, the district court ruled that the disputed land transactions were
not violations of the Nonintercourse Act and therefore could not be de-
clared null and void.43
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in its in-
structions to the jury respecting the "leadership or government" and
"united in a community" elements of the Montoya definition." Although
the First Circuit affirmed the district court decision, it nevertheless noted
that the Montoya definition was "far from satisfactory."'45 An analysis of
the district court jury instructions and the First Circuit opinion reveals
why this is so.
Regarding the "leadership or government" element of Montoya, the jury
was instructed "to decide whether . . . [there is] a leadership that is gov-
erning the conduct, the lives of the people in some significant way, that
people order their lives in response to these leaders' requirements in some
significant way ... ,46 Similarly, the jury was asked to decide whether
the leadership "would be followed, adopted and obeyed in some signifi-
cant degree by at least a majority of the people who are going to be a tribe
in 1976." 7 Political cohesion and the ability of the tribal leadership to
42. Id. at 943. The parties agreed that tribal existence at the time of the suit was neces-
sary. The opinion is silent as to the reason for this agreement, but the probable explanation
is that if the Indians seeking redress at the time of suit are not a tribe, any award they might
receive would be a windfall to individuals. Thus, the tribal entity that the Act is intended to
protect would not be protected, and the purposes of the Act would not be furthered.
43. Id. at 949-50.
44. 592 F.2d at 582.
45. Id. It is noteworthy that the court of appeals in Mashpee stressed that their holding
was narrow and that the case did not stand for the proposition that the district court's in-
structions to the jury were correct as a matter of law. Rather, it held that the instructions
conformed to the plaintiffs view of the law. Id. at 587. Judge Bownes, in his concurring
opinion, on the other hand, argued that the district court instructions should be held correct
as a matter of law. Id. at 595 (Bownes, J., concurring).
46. 592 F.2d at 584. Judge Skinner, in a similar vein, also told the jury:
Now, the existence of 30, 40, 50, 60 people, who are concerned with the existence of
a chief, who pay attention to what the chief is doing, expect various things from the
chief of the tribe or the leaders of the tribe, or the leaders of the group, rather, is
not enough. You've got to find that the leadership, whatever it is, has a significant
effect upon at least a majority of the claimed group.
Id. at 583.
47. Id. at 584. In this regard, the court of appeals stated:
[T]he court instructed the jury to consider the claims that the asserted leaders "are
leaders with respect to a way of life." Such leadership is certainly not expected to
be coercive or binding. Plaintiff was allowed to show leadership, at least in part, by
demonstrating that the alleged leaders were role-models to whom a majority of the
asserted tribe responded on questions of tribal or ethnic significance.
[Vol. 29:625
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influence the conduct of individual Mashpees was therefore stressed by the
trial judge as indicative of the Montoya leadership element.
These same factors of political cohesion and independent tribal author-
ity are reflected in the instructions to the jury respecting the "united in a
community" element. For instance, the Mashpee jury was instructed to
look for a boundary distinguishing the Indians as a group from the rest of
society.48  Discrimination against the Mashpees by non-Indians was
deemed a permissible basis for inferring the existence of the boundary,4 9
but the jury was also told that assimilation would indicate the absence of a
community. ° In other words, the instructions directed the jury's attention
towards tribal unity and emphasized group independence from non-Indian
society.
This emphasis on tribal unity and political cohesion, inherent in the
"leadership or government" and "united in a community" elements, is ill-
suited for application to the Nonintercourse Act because it diverts the
jury's attention from disintegrative outside influences, possibly traceable to
the very injury complained of, that can undermine a tribal structure. In
short, the elements do not take into account the importance of a land base
for Indians to maintain their tribal unity. If significant numbers of tribal
members lose their land, as in the Mashpee case, it is reasonable to expect
a degree of disintegration and dissipation in the group. Moreover, this
failure to recognize the causal relationship between the Indians' loss of
tribal land and a minimal amount of demonstrable political cohesiveness
is antithetical to the protective purposes of the Act and the liberal policies
of Indian law." Given these glaring inadequacies in the Montoya defini-
Id.
48. "Boundary" was used in the anthropological sense. Thus, the jury was told to de-
cide whether the Mashpees had "an attitude or consciousness of difference from others, a
sense of distinction between "we" and "they." Id. at 586 n.5.
49. Id. at 586.
50. Id.
51. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. Judicial recognition of a causal relation-
ship between an injury to legal rights and disintegration of group cohesiveness is not uncom-
mon. In the field of labor law, employers who are shown to have committed unfair labor
practices resulting in dissipation of a union's majority, for purposes of a recognition election,
can be ordered to bargain with the victimized union, despite the loss of majority employee
approval of the union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Franks
Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). In the context of Indian law, particularly the
protective purposes of the Indian Nonintercourse Act, a similar approach is needed because
it recognizes the practical difficulties of maintaining group cohesiveness when legal rights
are violated. See Red Lake & Pembina Bands v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans, 355 F.2d 936, 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (acknowledging the possible causal connection between
loss of land and disintegration of tribal unity.)
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tion, a more realistic standard for identifying bona fide Indian tribes must
be developed.
III. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION
Given the dearth of reasoned precedent and legislative history on the
definition of tribe under the Nonintercourse Act, only an examination of
the meaning of "tribe" in analogous areas of Indian law can provide the
necessary basis for formulating the improved definition. An examination
of the facets of Indian law analogous to the Indian Nonintercourse Act
will reveal the foundations for the following proposed definition:
A tribe is a body of Indians whose ancestors resided in North
America prior to its discovery by the European nations, able to
demonstrate that they continuously regarded themselves as a dis-
tinct cultural entity capable of self-regulation, though not neces-
sarily always in fact exercising their self-regulatory capabilities,
and inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined, terri-
tory.
A. The Indian Claims Commission Act
A substantial portion of the proposed definition is intended to corre-
spond to the concept of tribe as reflected in cases applying the Indian
Claims Commission Act. 52 Enacted in 1946, the Claims Act was intended
to remedy wrongs committed by the United States against Indians prior to
that date.53 The Act created the Indian Claims Commission and empow-
52. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976). The Claims Act provides:
The Commission shall hear and determine the following claims against the United
States on behalf of any Indian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American
Indians. . .(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, trea-
ties of the United States, and Executive orders of the President; (2) all other claims
in law or equity, including those sounding in tort, with respect to which the claim-
ant would have been entitled to sue in a court of the United States if the United
States was subject to suit; (3) claims which would result if the treaties, contracts,
and agreements between the claimant and the United States were revised on the
ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mis-
take, whether of law or fact, or any other ground cognizable by a court of equity;
(4) claims arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the result of a
treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without
the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant; and (5)
claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any ex-
isting rule of law or equity. ...
Id See Note, Administrative Law-The Indian Claims Commission's Jurisdiction to Hear
Claims Based on Injuries to Tribal Structure, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1097 (1974).
53. Red Lake & Pembina Bands v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 355
F.2d 936, 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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ered it to adjudicate claims against the United States brought by "any In-
dian tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians. ... .,4
The Claims Act allows nontribal groups of Indians, in addition to bona
fide tribes, to seek redress. It still provides a useful analogy, however, be-
cause, similar to the Nonintercourse Act, it is directed towards remedying
group, as opposed to individual, injuries and is protective in character."
Thus, an Indian group is enabled to obtain redress for land transactions
that involved fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionable consideration, or fail-
ure of consideration 56 as well as redress for "claims based upon fair and
honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or
equity."57 Consequently, the Claims Act provides a remedy for moral
wrongs, such as injuries to tribal culture, as well as legal wrongs, such as
those sounding in tort.58
The proposed definition adopts the analytic method of determining tri-
bal status as reflected in the Claims Act cases in two major respects. First,
it deemphasizes the importance of political cohesion and stresses the rele-
vance of the Indians' self-image. Second, it acknowledges the possibility
of a causal relationship between the alleged injury and the present condi-
tion of the tribal structure.
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. United States " illustrates the
need and judicial willingness to downgrade political cohesion as a factor in
determining tribal status. The case involved a land claim in which more
than one group of Indians alleged entitlement to the same general land
area.6" Political cohesion was in issue because there was disagreement on
the question of whether various bands had operated as autonomous enti-
ties at the time of injury.6 The Warm Springs court looked to factors such
as similarity of dialect, culinary preferences, economic freedom of interac-
tion, and religious practices in order to determine whether the various
54. 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976).
55. Red Lake & Pembina Bands v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 355
F.2d at 943. But, unlike the Nonintercourse Act, a formal tribal organization is not neces-
sary at the time of suit. Id. See also Thompson v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 348, 357-58,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952) (redress available for claims based upon inheritance alone).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 70a(3), (4) (1976).
57. Id. § 70a(5).
58. See Note, Repaying Historical Debts: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D.L.
REV. 359, 389-91 (1973).
59. 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1967). The claimant Indians brought suit under the Claims Act to
recover the value of lands located in Oregon. Id. at 189.
60. Id. at 193-98.
61. There was some evidence that more than one band of Indians had used the land in
issue as a common subsistance area. Id. at 206.
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bands were culturally unified.6 2 Concluding that the bands were culturally
unified, the court paid very little attention to the cohesiveness of their po-
litical structure.63
Warm Springs is more realistic than Mashpee on the issue of political
cohesion because it focuses upon how the Indians actually ordered their
lives rather than on how non-Indian society believed they should have
been organized. For this reason, the Warm Springs perspective is particu-
larly appropriate for interpreting "tribe" in the context of the
Nonintercourse Act. Its cultural emphasis permits judges and juries to
identify bona fide, albeit confusing, Indian forms of social organization
such as the loosely structured Warm Springs tribes, without reference to
the irrelevant standards associated with non-Indian forms of government.
Additionally, the Warm Springs approach logically is far preferable to the
Montoya definition because it was developed in relation to a law dealing
with Indian claims to land rather than to a law dealing with claims arising
from Indian acts of destruction, such as the Depredation Act.
Another Claims Act case stressing the importance of cultural factors and
how Indians view themselves is Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
v. United States.64 The United States argued in Turtle Mountain that the
Indian claimants had no right to establish aboriginal title to the land in
issue because of widespread Chippewa intermarriage with non-Indians.65
The Turtle Mountain court rejected the argument, however, preferring to
go beyond a simple blood analysis to determine which individuals should
be counted as Indians for purposes of proving aboriginal title. The court
looked to evidence that full-blooded Indians viewed the mixed-bloods as
Indians,66 that the two groups had a history of hunting together, that they
had acted together in their negotiations with the United States, and that
62. Id. at 206-07.
63. Id See also Upper Chehalis Tribe v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (Ct.
Cl. 1957).
64. 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. CI. 1974) (involving claims of three different Indian bands all of
whom alleged kinship to the same general ancestral group). See also Iowa Tribe of Iowa
Reservation v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 365 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017 (1972) (at-
tempt by two tribes to prove joint and amicable possession for purposes of establishing ab-
original title).
65. 490 F.2d at 942. The crux of the government's argument was that mixed-bloods
could not be counted as Indians for the purpose of demonstrating the use and occupancy by
the Chippewa necessary to prove aboriginal title. Id.
66. Id. at 942-43. The court rejected biological standards for determining Indian use
and occupancy entirely, quoting a definition of "Indian" suggested by Felix Cohen, a lead-
ing Indian law scholar. According to Cohen, an Indian should be defined as any person who
can demonstrate "(a) [tihat some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the
white race, and (b) that the individual is considered an "Indian" by the community in which
he lives." Id. at 942-43 (quoting F. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (1942)).
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some of the mixed-bloods considered the chief of the full-bloods as their
own.6 7 In concluding that the mixed-bloods were part of the Chippewa
tribe, the court also noted that the mixed-bloods conducted themselves as
an Indian organization distinct from non-Indian governments.68 This sub-
jective, rather than objective, determination of "tribe," like the Warm
Springs focus on tribal culture, is particularly appropriate as a method for
determining tribal status under the Nonintercourse Act. Not only does it
reflect the protective purposes of the Act, it also implicitly allows for a
degree of assimilation and dissipation in the tribe after a loss of tribal land.
Once tribal land is lost, it is reasonable to expect Indian assimilation into
non-Indian society. The loss of hunting, fishing, and crop lands would
necessarily require the Indians to embrace non-Indian society simply to
survive. It is impossible for the courts to restore the lost heritage of the
Indians, but the detrimental effects resulting from the loss can certainly be
taken into consideration when determining the legal existence of a tribe.
B. The BIA Regulations
The recently adopted BIA regulations for federal recognition69 of Indian
tribes do not acknowledge the possibility of a causal connection between
loss of land and disintegration of the tribal structure. The regulations do,
however, partly embrace the approach for determining tribal status that is
reflected in the Claims Act cases in two particulars. First, the regulations
require that an Indian group prove a "substantially continuous tribal exist-
ence,"70 with "repeated identification and dealing as an Indian entity with
recognized Indian tribes or national Indian organizations"'' being consid-
ered probative of the issue. Besides favoring reliance on how the Indians
view themselves for determining tribal existence, the regulations also
adopt the position that tribal organization should be analyzed from the
perspective of the Indian culture.72
67. Id. at 943.
68. Id. at 944.
69. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (1978). There are basically three ways for a tribe to secure
federal recognition. Such recognition can be attained through a continuous policy of admin-
istrative conduct, by formal treaty, or by mention of the tribe in federal statutes. See Joint
Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376 (1st Cir. 1975).
70. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,362 (1978). The regulations define continuously as meaning "ex-
tending from generation to generation throughout the tribe's history essentially without in-
terruption." Id.
71. Id. at 39,363.
72. The regulations define autonomous as:
[Hlaving a separate tribal council, internal process, or other organizational mech-
anism which the tribe has used as its own means of making tribal decisions in-
dependent of the control of any other Indian governing entity. Autonomous must
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The BIA and the Claims Act cases do not, however, attach equal weight
to political cohesion in deciding who is a "tribe." Stressing political cohe-
sion much more heavily, the BIA states in the explanatory introduction to
its new regulations that "[m]aintenance of tribal relations-a political rela-
tionship-is indispensable" for the existence of a tribe.7 3 Yet, it is unclear
what degree of political unity is required by the regulations. The source of
the ambiguity is the requirement that a petitioning Indian group prove that
it "has maintained tribal political influence or other authority over its
members as an autonomous entity throughout history until the present. '74
The phrase "or other authority" suggests that a tribe can exist as a distinct
entity, perhaps maintaining its separate character by operation of cultural
factors that set it apart from the rest of society, without exercising political
influence over its members. On balance, however, it is more reasonable to
interpret the regulations as requiring evidence of political cohesion but not
as much political cohesion as the Montoya definition with its specific re-
quirement of a "leadership or government." In essence, on the issue of
political cohesion, the regulations most probably are conceptually some-
where between Montoya and the Claims Act approach.
Since the regulations represent an alternative to the Montoya definition
and are designed to take into account the Indian viewpoint and culture,
courts may be inclined to adopt the regulations in place of Montoya for
purposes of defining "tribe" within the meaning of the Nonintercourse
Act. However, the regulations are general in nature and are not specifi-
cally designed to further the purposes of the Nonintercourse Act. The re-
quirements for tribal status under the Nonintercourse Act may not be the
same requirements for other purposes, such as eligibility for federal bene-
fits.75 Accordingly, a definition specifically designed to further the pur-
poses of the Nonintercourse Act, such as the one presented herein, is
eminently more desirable than a general definition formulated for various
unrelated purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Careful analysis of the cases applying the Montoya definition to the
Nonintercourse Act reveals the definition's inadequacies. Every court ap-
plying Montoya to the Act has failed to recognize that the definition, which
be understood in the context of the Indian culture and social organization of that
tribe.
Id. at 39,362.
73. Id. at 39,361-62.
74. Id. at 39,363.
75. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. at 950 n.7.
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evolved largely by historical accident, does not further the protective pur-
poses of the Act nor the liberal tenets of Indian law. Given the close simi-
larity between the Nonintercourse Act and the Claims Act, analogy to the
latter provides a logical basis for improving the definition of "tribe" under
the Nonintercourse Act. The definition proposed in this Comment is an
improvement over Montoya because it embraces the Claims Act approach,
the validity of which is bolstered by the new BIA regulations, and rejects
the misplaced reliance on political cohesion. Most importantly, the defini-
tion acknowledges the always overlooked causal connection between the
loss of land and the present condition of a tribe's structure.
Steven A. Knecht

